The United States and Economic and Social Rights: Past, Present…and Future? by Whelan, Daniel J.
Human Rights & Human Welfare 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 60 
2-28-2005 
The United States and Economic and Social Rights: Past, 
Present…and Future? 
Daniel J. Whelan 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Whelan, Daniel J. (2005) "The United States and Economic and Social Rights: Past, Present…and Future?," 
Human Rights & Human Welfare: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 60. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/60 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Josef Korbel School of International Studies 
at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights & Human Welfare by an authorized 









working paper no. 26 
 
The United States and economic and social rights: 
past, present…and future? 
 
 
by Daniel J. Whelan 
 
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver 




Presented at the 2005 International Studies Association Convention, 
On the panel, Human Rights as a Foreign Policy Goal: Rhetoric, Realism and Results
Saturday, March 5, 2005 
Honolulu, Hawaii 
 
Posted on 28 February 2005 
 
http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working/2005/26-whelan-2005.pdf   
 
 
© 2005 Daniel J. Whelan. All rights reserved. 
 
 
This paper may be freely circulated in electronic or hard copy provided it is not modified in any way, the rights of the author not infringed, and the 
paper is not quoted or cited without express permission of the author. The editors cannot guarantee a stable URL for any paper posted here, nor will 
they be responsible for notifying others if the URL is changed or the paper is taken off the site. Electronic copies of this paper may not be posted on 
any other website without express permission of the author. 
 
The posting of this paper on the hrhw working papers website does not constitute any position of opinion or judgment about the contents, 
arguments or claims made in the paper by the editors. For more information about the hrhw working papers series or website, please visit the site 
online at http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/working. 
1
Whelan: The United States and Economic and Social Rights






The United States and Economic and Social Rights: 




By Daniel J. Whelan 
 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Graduate School of International Studies 
University of Denver 
 
 
Presented at the 2005 International Studies Association Convention 
Honolulu, Hawaii 






















This paper is a draft. Please do not use or quote, in part or in whole, without the express permission 
of the author. 
 
2
Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 60
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/60
The Economic and Social “Rights” Conundrum 
 
There is probably no other topic in the field of human rights that is more difficult to talk about 
clearly than economic and social rights. The language surrounding economic and social goods as 
rights claims is often muddled and confusing, lacks precision, and is difficult to grasp. What does it 
mean, for example, to have a right to the “highest attainable standard of mental and physical health,” 
for example? What is “highest”? What about “attainable standard”? What is included in “mental and 
physical health?” Should health care be free-of-charge? Should the state provide it? Would we have 
to go court to prove we have a need for this “standard?” How do we determine when there has been 
a violation of this right? 
 
One of the problems with economic and social rights is that they often are taken to mean “welfare 
entitlements,” “social support,” or, in the language of economic conservatives, “give-aways.” 
Therefore debates about whether we should believe in economic and social rights as rights must 
center on debates about welfare. This is an intractable divide that will never be bridged. But must 
one believe in economic and social rights in order to believe part of the ethical purpose of the 
modern state is to protect every person’s potential or actual ability to will his or her own ends? 
 
This paper is going to explore how the United States has dealt with economic and social rights as 
human rights—their history, their status as rights, and ways in which we might reconceptualize them 
in a more meaningful way, not as rights, but as obligations arising from other rights that Americans 
do believe in. One of the problems with discussing economic and social rights has always been that 
the terms of the debate are framed in such as way as to require extreme, intractable positions. 
Opponents simply reject economic and social rights wholesale. Proponents seem to conflate the 
language of rights with the rhetoric of social, redistributive justice. The debate is at cross purposes 
because the terms are unclear. 
 
By “economic and social rights” I am referring to those things listed in Articles 22 through 27 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.1 President Jimmy Carter signed the Covenant on October 5, 1977—along with the 
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR). The rights contained in these two 
treaties are almost always described as being “interdependent, indivisible and interrelated.” The 
United States Senate finally ratified the ICCPR in 1992—albeit after attaching a number of 
reservations, declarations and understandings.2 The U.S. has yet to ratify the ICESCR. And it 
probably never will. 
 
There are two dimensions of U.S. human rights policy: domestic and international. In order to 
understand the American refusal to officially endorsing economic and social rights in both domestic 
and foreign policy, and how that might someday be transcended, requires some understanding of 
both dimensions. Fortunately, two historical periods reflect these dimensions and the problems law-
makers, policy makers and others have had with economic and social rights. The first period in 
particular is glossed over as simply the product of Cold War diplomatic rivalry—that the United 
                                                 
1 I am purposefully not including “cultural rights” in this category. For one, there really is only one “cultural right” which 
appears in the Declaration and the Covenant. However, I believe that the first of these rights—the right to take part in 
cultural life—is a civil right. The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress is, in my mind, a social right. The final 
one—essentially, the right personal copyright protection—is clearly a part of property right, which is economic. 
2 For an excellent overview of these “RUDS,” see Schabas (2000). 
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States could not accept economic and social rights because “our” rights were the civil and political 
ones, and economic and social rights were the Soviet ones. The problem with this conclusion, of 
course, is that the Cold War is over and the U.S. still does not recognize economic and social rights. 
Thus, the first part of this paper will explore the evolution of U.S. thinking on economic and social 
rights from the time they were first proposed by Franklin Roosevelt in during World War II, until 
their rejection by the middle of the 1950s. This period is about the domestic applicability of 
economic and social rights, and in particular the “treaty problem”—that the U.S. generally does not 
believe that international law is the most appropriate way to secure human rights. The second 
period—which will illustrate the international dimension of U.S. attitudes toward economic and 
social rights as a matter of foreign policy—begins with the official recognition of U.S. support for 
economic and social rights during the Carter administration, to its quick demise in the 1980s.  
 
This historical overview will take us from (a) American support of the idea, to (b) mounting 
opposition after the War—opposition that nearly culminated in a Constitutional amendment curbing 
the President’s treaty making power, to (c) a brief and ultimately meaningless “recognition” of 
economic and social rights by the Carter administration, to (d) their ultimately abandonment in the 
1980s—first by opposition, and finally by outright neglect. Whatever economic and social rights 
might be, clearly they are a matter for development policy, not international law. But there is an 
interesting mirroring even in that respect, in how U.S. development policies reflect its domestic 
attitudes about economic and social rights. A subtext running through this—but which cannot be 
examined in great detail here—is the American “vision” of the role that rights play in the individual’s 
relationship with the state and civil society—including the market. Could we go back to an 
understanding of economic and social “rights” that Franklin Delano Roosevelt had? 
 
The Legacy of the Roosevelts 
 
Often cited as marking the advent of the international human rights era is U.S. President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union address, wherein he pledged that, as a nation, the American 
people “look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms:” freedom of speech 
and expression; freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Earlier in that 
speech, Roosevelt reflected on the war in Europe—a war the U.S. had not yet entered—and how 
important it was for the United States to provide the necessary materiel to those countries opposing 
the Axis powers. What was at stake, he reminded the nation, was democracy and freedom, and the 
institutions necessary for protecting them. This demanded sacrifice on the part of the public. But 
that sacrifice was part of a two-way relationship between the people and the government in a 
“healthy and strong democracy:” 
 
The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic systems are simple. They are: equality of 
opportunity for youth and for others; jobs for those who can work; security for those who need it; the ending of 
special privilege for the few; the preservation of civil liberties for all; the enjoyment of the fruits of scientific 
progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of living. 
 
These are the simple, the basic things that must never be lost sight of in the turmoil and unbelievable complexity 
of our modern world.  The inner and abiding straight of our economic and political systems is dependent upon 
the degree to which they fulfill these expectations.3
 
                                                 
3 Full text online at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrthefourfreedoms.htm (accessed February 24, 2005). 
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Eight months later, Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic 
Charter, a set of “common principles” held by both countries. In particular, “they desire to bring 
about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, 
for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.”4  
 
On January 11, 1944, Roosevelt delivered his State of the Union address over the radio. He outlined 
an ambitious legislative agenda that he urged Congress to take up, regarding the conduct of the war. 
In addition to urging Congress to pass legislation to curb war profiteering, Roosevelt suggested a 
“national service law,” the civilian equivalent of a military draft (Levine and Levine 2002: 516-517). 
While this was the most controversial program in the speech—organized labor and business groups 
opposed it—the idea enjoyed fairly widespread support from the public. In an echo of his 1941 
speech, Roosevelt suggested that while the American republic was based on the rights and freedoms 
protected by the original bill of rights, the nation had already begun to accept a number of self-
evident economic truths: “We have come to a clearer realization of the fact, however, that true 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. ‘Necessitous men are 
not free men.’ People who are hungry, people who are out of a job are the stuff of which 
dictatorships are made” (Levine and Levine 2002: 522).  
 
Roosevelt suggested that the nation had already accepted the idea of a “second bill of rights,” and 
that it was time Congress enacted it formally. Among these rights were: 
 
The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation; 
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; 
The right of farmers to raise and sell their products at a return which will give them and their families a decent 
living;  
The right of every business man, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition 
and domination by monopolies at home or abroad; 
The right of every family to a decent home; 
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health; 
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, and sickness, and accident, and 
unemployment; 
And finally, the right to a good education.5
 
Out of a sampling of the many thousands of letters Roosevelt received after this speech, 18 are 
published in a recently published collection of post-radio address letters sent to the White House. 
Thirteen approved of the speech, and five did not. Four letters specifically mentioned this “second 
bill of rights”—and all four approved of the idea (Levine and Levine 2002: 525-538). Without 
actually saying so, they seemed to understand it not only as a natural extension of the New Deal, but 
also as a new kind of social contract: National Service in exchange for economic and social 
guarantees. Roosevelt had already proposed a “GI Bill of Rights” in July 1943; one of the “rights” in 
that bill, of course, was the right of every returning veteran to get a college degree or other training 
at the government’s expense. Roosevelt signed the GI Bill on June 22. 1944. 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, the content of this new set of “rights” is remarkably similar to several of the 
rights that would eventually appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICESCR. 
The important exceptions are two “market” rights: one of farmers to receive a return on their crops 
                                                 
4 Online at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm (accessed February 24, 2005). 
5 Levine and Levine (2002: 522). Full text of the speech online at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/011144.html 
(accessed February 24, 2005). 
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adequate for a decent standard of living, and the right of access to markets not dominated by 
monopolies. Whereas the first could conceivably be subsumed under the overall right to work and 
make enough pay for a decent standard of living, the second “right” has no expression whatsoever 
in the Universal Declaration or the ICESCR. It could be argued that, in comparison to the others it 
is not properly a right. But in a way, it seems to sit quite comfortably alongside the others.  
 
 
Table 1: Roosevelt’s Economic Bill of Rights, the Universal Declaration and the ICESCR 
Roosevelt’s 2nd Bill Universal Declaration ICESCR 
Useful and remunerative job; right 
to earn enough to provide 
adequate standard of living and 
recreation 
Article 23 (right to work; free 
choice of employment; just and 
favorable conditions of work; 
equal pay for equal work; just and 
favorable remuneration); Article 
24 (right to rest and leisure) 
Article 6 (right to work; free choice of 
employment); Article 7 (just and favorable 
conditions of work; fair wages; equal pay 
for equal work; pay that provides a decent 
living; safe and healthy working conditions) 
Right of farmers to earn enough 
to support their families 
  
Right of market access   
Right of every family to a decent 
home; adequate medical care; 
opportunity to achieve good 
health; social insurance/security 
protections 
Article 25: Right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack 
of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control 
Article 9 (social security/social insurance); 
Article 11 (the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and 
his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living 
conditions; fundamental right of everyone 
to be free from hunger; Article 12 (the right 
of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health). 
Right to education Article 26 (right to education) Article 13 (right to education) 
 
 
It is illuminating that Roosevelt chose the language of right in order to highlight the importance of 
economic and social security in the modern world. In the 1941 “four freedoms” speech, he 
suggested that many of these things, and some others, were what people expected from their 
political and economic systems. Three years later, he suggests that rights are the way to guarantee them. 
But there is the interaction between the state and the market in the realization of these rights. As 
Sunstein (2004) points out, Roosevelt was certainly no socialist, and he despised the idea of “the 
dole.” He believed that type of welfare would destroy incentive and would create an unhealthy and 
destructive sense of entitlement (Ibid., 194). While he did believe the state should ensure that those 
who were not able to meet their own needs, because of old age, accidents, or other circumstances 
beyond their control, he also believed that the state had a vital role to play in creating and 
maintaining economic conditions and opportunities necessary for the able-bodied to do for 
themselves. And that didn’t mean mere survival—it meant fostering the development of people’s 
capabilities to move them as far away from that brink that so many had reached during the worst 
years of the Great Depression. 
 
After the War, the protection of “human rights and fundamental freedoms” became one of the 
founding principles of the United Nations. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights was created in 
1946, with Eleanor Roosevelt as its first chair. The Commission was tasked by the Economic and 
Social Council to begin work immediately on drafting an “International Bill of Rights,” to consist of 
a declaration of human rights, an international treaty to enshrine those rights in international law, 
 4
6
Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 60
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/60
and some institutional arrangement implementation. The earliest proposal from Australia would 
have created a separate human rights court. 
 
No sooner had the Commission begun its work than began sometimes sharp disagreements about 
what should be considered to be a “human right.” It also became clear that the drafting of a 
covenant and means of implementation would require more time and care in order to provide the 
detail necessary for international legal instruments. Thus, the Commission concentrated instead on 
drafting the declaration,6 which was eventually adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, nemine 
contradicente, on December 10, 1948. 
 
The Declaration contained 25 articles7 enumerating a wide range of what would later be classified as 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Table 1 shows that every one of the rights that 
Roosevelt proposed Congress guarantee by federal legislation in 1944 was included in the grouping 
of “economic and social rights”—Articles 22 through 27—of the Universal Declaration. The only 
right not mentioned by Roosevelt that was subsequently classified as a “civil” and a “social” right8 is 
Article 16: the right to marry and found a family, and the equal rights of men and women in entering 
marriage, and at its dissolution. One other right not mentioned by Roosevelt in the 1944 speech was 
Article 27, “the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and 
to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” However, in Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the 
Union address, he did mention “the enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress” as a reasonable 
expectation of the American people. 
 
The United States’ active support for human rights at the U.N., coupled with Roosevelt’s domestic 
legacy on economic and social guarantees and the popularity of his Presidency, would suggest that 
moving from the Declaration to a treaty of human rights would have been quite simple. When John 
Foster Dulles was serving as acting chairman of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, he 
remarked that it would be vital to turn the principles in the Declaration into binding treaty law 
immediately.9  
 
Despite this level of support, in an extremely short period of time—a little more than four years—
official support would erode and eventually collapse under the weight of an almost-successful 
attempt to amend the Constitution to limit the President’s treaty-making authority, in order to 
prevent economic and social rights from being recognized. How could such a reversal happen in 
such a short amount of time, and what can this episode in American history tell us about the status 
and meaning of economic and social rights in the United States today? Most accounts of the history 
of economic and social rights in the United States overlook this period of time, or perhaps fail to 
recognize that there was more to the debate than anti-communism: 
 
                                                 
6 The original title of the draft was the “International Declaration of Human Rights,” which was changed to the “United 
Nations Declaration,” and finally, “Universal Declaration.” The drafters wanted to shift the emphasis from the 
authors—states and the United Nations itself—to the “intended audience of ordinary men and women” (Morsink 1999: 
33). 
7 The Declaration has 30 articles; four of them do not enumerate a specific right or associated cluster of rights. I 
purposely left out Article 28: that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.” I would not call that a human right. 
8 Marriage rights appear in the Declaration and both Covenants. 
9 Dulles (1948). See also Green (1956: 37). 
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If there ever was an excuse for [the silence of human rights groups in economic and social rights], it ended with 
the Cold War. No longer can there be any claim that pressing for human rights at home plays into the hands of 
America’s enemies abroad (Stark 2000: 84). 
 
This view assumes (a) that this “claim” was anything more than a scare-tactic, and (b) that the 
silence was only a result of Cold War politics. I believe that anti-communism in the 1940s and 1950s, 
in terms of domestic opposition to economic and social rights was concerned, merely masked a 
disagreement among Americans about the importance of the state and civil society—including the 
market—for allowing us to enjoy the objects of these “rights.” Nevertheless, a detailed look at this 
period is illuminating, if only to uncover a history that is significant for understand American 
attitudes about economic and social rights in terms of their domestic application. I believe this 
period says far more about how these rights are best secured (through treaties?) than anything about 
the content of those rights.  
 
From the Universal Declaration to the Bricker Amendment 
 
In early 1948, the U.S. government offered a proposal to the Commission on Human Rights, 
regarding what should be included in the Universal Declaration: 
 
Among the categories of right which, the United states suggests should be considered are the following: (a) 
Personal rights, such as freedom of speech, information, religion, and rights of property; (b) Procedural rights, 
such as safeguards for persons accused of crime; (c) Social rights such as the right to employment and social 
security and the right to enjoy minimum standards of economic, social and cultural well-being; (d) Political rights, 
such as the right to citizenship and the right of citizens to participate in their government (Sohn 1948: 283). 
 
It should be recalled that, at the same time, the Commission was also considering a draft covenant, 
which contained no economic or social rights at that time. They had set aside working on the 
Covenant in order to focus on the Declaration. The inclusion of these categories of rights in the 
Declaration was definitely supported by a number of civil society organizations in the United States. 
However, one in particular—the American Bar Association—became ever more vocal against the 
idea, starting in early 1948. While most of the opinions and articles appearing it the American Bar 
Association Journal during this time were specifically leveled at the draft covenant on human rights, 
the leadership of the ABA, and its newly created Committee for Peace and Law Through United 
Nations, were seriously disturbed about the consequences of the United States agreeing to a 
Declaration of Human Rights, and what obligations would be placed on the U.S. with regard to 
those rights. In 1948, the ABA issued a joint resolution with the Canadian Bar Association, which 
urged that 
 
Any Declaration on Human Rights should not be in any manner approved, accepted or promulgated by or in 
behalf of the government of the United States except upon and after the submission of such document to, and 
the approval of it by, the Congress of the United States (American Bar Association 1948: 338) 
 
The fear that the United States would be legally bound to protect the rights listed in the Declaration 
was based on the specious argument that the Declaration was an enumeration of the term “human 
rights and fundamental freedoms,” the protection of which was incumbent upon member-states of 
the United Nations under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter—which is a legally-binding treaty. This, 
of course, ignored the understanding that the United States had of the purpose and effect of the 
Declaration, first stated in December 17, 1947, that “[t]he Declaration is not intended to be a 
legislative document in any sense. Since it is the proper purpose of the Declaration to set forth basic 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms, as standards for the United Nations, it is inappropriate to 
state the rights in the Declaration in terms of governmental responsibility” (Sohn 1948: 476). The 
United Nations would have never been able to promulgate a document of such scope and generality 
as the Universal Declaration had any government believed it to be binding under international law.10  
 
The ink on the Declaration was barely dry when proponents of continued U.S. involvement with 
giving human rights the status of treaty law began back-pedaling on economic and social rights. 
Perhaps in an effort to stave off critics like those in the ABA, immediately after the Declaration was 
adopted, Eleanor Roosevelt clarified that: “the United States Government does not consider that 
economic, social and cultural rights imply an obligation on governments to assure the enjoyment of 
these rights by direct government action” (Kunz 1949: 322). As the Commission began to take up 
the unfinished work on the draft Covenant on Human Rights, this statement presaged what would 
become the eventual American position: that economic, social and cultural rights are not really 
“rights”—or that the U.S. would not consider them to be so. 
 
The American Bar Association was indispensable to this movement. Generally, they were against the 
idea of promoting human rights through treaty law—in fact, they took a position not very different 
from that the Soviet Union, South Africa and other states would take over the years: that they did 
not want international “intrusion” on their sovereignty. But they were incensed over the idea of 
economic and social rights. Just as the Declaration was being adopted, the new President of the 
Association, Frank Holman, began to write a series of articles focused on the draft Covenant, and 
the danger that it would pose to the United States. Holman was convinced that human rights were 
central to a communist plan to destroy the American way of life (Kaufman 1990: 16). The very idea 
of “economic and social rights” would mean a centralized, planned economy and the destruction of 
free enterprise. And, of course, the movement must be subversive: not only had the public and 
“even the Bar” been ignorant of how different these “human rights” were in comparison to 
American concepts of rights and freedoms, they were also clearly unaware of “how far in other 
particulars it is a proposal for world-wide socialism to be imposed through the United Nations on 
the United States and on every other member nation” (Holman 1948: 985). 
 
To Holman and the members of the Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, this 
conspiracy was plainly evident from the provisions for economic, social and cultural rights that had 
been included in the Declaration, and might be included in the Covenant:  
 
These latter articles do not pretend to limit the powers of government, but on the contrary, impose so-called 
economic and social duties upon government, the fulfillment of which will require a planned economy and a 
control by government of individual action. This program, if adopted, will promote state socialism, if not 
communism, throughout the world” (Holman 1948: 1080). 
 
The initial draft Covenant on Human Rights contained only “civil and political” rights. However, 
stressing the belief that “when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not 
represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man,”11 
the General Assembly directed the Economic and Social Council to include economic, social and 
cultural rights, “in a manner which relates them to the civil and political freedoms proclaimed by the 
                                                 
10 This is not to say that the Universal Declaration did not become, over time, a part of customary international law, as 
some scholars argue. It is undisputed that some specific rights in the Declaration—such as freedom from torture or 
genocide—constitute jus cogens.   
11 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 421 (V), December 4, 1950, §E, preamble.  
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draft Covenant.”12 This move effectively strangled the work of the Commission, which became 
embroiled—along with the Economic and Social Council—in debates over the different kinds of 
implementation and monitoring mechanisms that would be required to ensure the protection and 
promotion of different categories of rights. Not wanting to draft a “treaty within a treaty,” the 
General Assembly eventually agreed that the Commission should draft two separate treaties, which 
nonetheless would be opened for ratification at the same time.13
 
But until this decision was taken in 1952, opposition to U.S. involvement with the U.N.’s human 
rights enterprise became fierce. There were basically three “interwoven themes” prevalent in the 
opposition. The first was that the covenant would violate domestic jurisdiction or sovereignty by 
allowing international scrutiny of human rights problems in the U.S. Second, by virtue of the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the obligations of the covenant would require the expansion 
of the powers of the federal government to the detriment of states’ rights. Finally, the covenant 
would enhance communist influence in the U.S., and usher in socialism (Kaufman 1990: 17). 
 
Because of the size of the organization, and the paucity of domestic civil society organizations that 
were actively promoting U.S. involvement in human rights activities at the U.N., the ABA’s 
influence on policymakers and public opinion was significant. In 1953, 61% of U.S. Senators were 
lawyers, and presumably members of the ABA (Kaufman 1990: 20). The position of the Association 
as a whole was largely driven by the activities of the President—Holman—and the seven-member 
Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations, which had taken over the ABA’s activities 
in this area from the usually more sober and even-keeled Section on Comparative and International 
Law (ibid., 20-21). The Committee consisted of a solid block of opposition to the human rights 
activities at the U.N., and routinely fed that opposition with hefty shovelfuls of anticommunist hype. 
The other tie-in, of course, was a fear that U.S. ratification of a human rights treaty would encourage  
the emerging civil rights movement in the U.S., which of course was tied into the states’ rights 
concern. Holman even wrote in 1949 that Article 16 of the Universal Declaration “means that mixed 
marriages between the races are allowable without regard to state or national law or policy 
forbidding such marriages” (Holman 1949: 483). 
 
The most concerted and extensive attack on economic and social rights as “back-door communism” 
was delivered by William Fleming in 1951, in a two part exegesis that appeared in the pages of the 
ABA Journal. The first part focused on economic and social rights, which were still included in the 
draft Covenant. As for the inclusion of these rights, Fleming wrote, “It is impossible not to 
recognize the heavy imprint of Eastern philosophy. As a matter of fact, Part III is nothing else but 
the perfect embodiment of the unadulterated welfare state and unmitigated socialism” (Fleming 
1951: 794). He saw in the “right to work” the end of free enterprise (ibid., 795) and was convinced 
that “adoption of the covenant would mean the end of our colleges” because of the provision that 
states gradually introduce free higher education, which would require a government takeover. If that 
were not bad enough, consider the consequence: “[t]he private liberal arts colleges, important 
bulwarks of the free world in the struggle against communism and totalitarianism, would be driven 
from the American scene…” (ibid., 796). The United States would be required to provide social 
security “for the whole world,” and eventually the Covenant would lead to the establishment of 
global economic planning by the United Nations. (ibid., 799). 
                                                 
12 Ibid., §E, paragraph 7(b). The resolution recognized that the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms, and of economic, 
social and cultural rights was “interconnected and interdependent.” 
13 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 543 (VI), February 5, 1952. 
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Opponents to the Covenant took offense at the U.N.’s definition of “civil and political rights” as 
well. The right protecting “freedom of movement,” for example, would certainly frustrate 
enforcement of the Internal Security Act (or McCarran Act) of 1950, which provided for the 
fingerprinting and registration of “subversives”—especially communists. Freedom of asylum would 
overturn the barring of communists from entering the United States, which was also provided for in 
the Act.14
 
This small but influential group within the ABA began to pressure key U.S. Senators into action to 
prevent the U.S. from becoming a party to the Covenant. By this time—1952 and 1953—despite the 
fact that the U.N. had agreed to draft two separate human rights treaties—the ICESCR and the 
ICCPR—the ABA under the direction of Holman and others found an ally in Senator John Bricker, 
a Republican from Ohio, close associate of Joseph McCarthy, and staunch opponent of U.N. treaties 
on human rights. The ABA had actually drafted on version of the amendment, and all seven 
members of the ABA committee leading this movement testified before a subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee (Schubert 1954: 262). The main concern they were attempting to rectify 
was the “self-executing” nature of treaties under Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution (the 
“Supremacy Clause”) which places treaty law at the same level as constitutional and statute law. 
Another, more controversial part of the Amendment would have restricted the power of the 
President to enter into other types of agreements in the foreign policy field without first receiving 
approval of the Senate.15 The version of the Amendment offered up by the ABA further stipulated 
that the individual states would have to adopt implementing legislation before the terms of a treaty 
would become valid in their states. 
 
The incoming Eisenhower administration became quite concerned about the amendment, especially 
its potentially debilitating effect on the power of the President to conduct foreign policy. Thus, on 
April 6, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
and pledged that the administration would not sign any human rights treaty currently under 
negotiation at the U.N. (i.e., the Covenant), any human rights treaty completed (i.e., the Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women), nor would the administration seek ratification of the Genocide 
Convention, which had been before the Senate since 1948. Dulles also promised to give the Senate 
the opportunity to “advise and consent” during the negotiation of future treaties.16  
 
After these assurances from the Administration were delivered, support for the Bricker Amendment 
began to drop away. The United Nations had already voted to split the draft covenant into two 
separate treaties. Despite this, and perhaps as a show for the Senate, Dulles instructed the U.S. 
delegate to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to persuade the Commission to “give up trying 
to draft a legal instrument defining social, political [sic] and economic ‘rights’” (New York Times 
1953).  U.S. activity in the Commission from this point forward—dubbed the “United States Action 
Program”—reduced the emphasis on the international legal aspects of protecting and promoting 
human rights, favoring instead a system of periodic, voluntary self-reporting on the status of human 
rights in member-states countries, studies on specific human rights problems throughout the world, 
                                                 
14 (Fleming 1951: 818). Truman initially vetoes the Act, complaining that it flew in the fact of civil liberties. Congress 
overrode the veto. The law was finally repealed in 1990—only to be partially resurrected in the guise of the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
15 The text of all six versions of the amendment can be found in Kaufman (1990: 201-203) 
16 New York Times, April 7, 1953 (1). For the full text of Dulles’ statement, see Dulles (1953). 
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and advisory services in the form of seminars, scholarships and technical assistance similar to that 
being done already in the social and economic and public administration fields (Moskowitz 1958: 65-
66). By December 1954, the U.N. General Assembly requested that its Third Committee begin an 
article-by-article review of both covenants;17 “[s]o began over a decade of detailed scrutiny” 
(McGoldrick 1991: 9). They were finally approved by the U.N. and opened up for signature in 1966, 
by which time the attentions of U.S. foreign policy were focused almost exclusively on southeast 
Asia. While the United States voted in the General Assembly for the resolutions opening up both 
Covenants for ratification, the U.S. would not sign the treaties until 1977—a year after both had 
come into force. 
 
It is quite tempting, especially from a distance of 50 years, to snicker at such anti-communist hype 
and the absurdity of a human rights treaty destroying the American way of life. What is important 
here is the manner in which we can use this history to provide a glimpse into how U.S. lawmakers 
and others view the domestic effect of human rights. There is a great deal of literature underscoring 
the ways in which the United States used the prioritization of civil and political rights for diplomatic 
purposes, and while the arguments against economic and social rights during this time were certainly 
linked to international tensions, they took on a life of their own domestically. The twenty-year 
stretch between Bricker and Helsinki was a very quiet one. When a domestic debate about economic 
and social rights emerged again in the 1970s and 1980s, it took on a different character, focused far 
more on the effect that recognizing those rights might mean for our foreign policy than 
domestically. 
 
Carter, Reagan and the Death of Economic and Social Rights  
 
The closest the United States ever came to formally recognizing economic and social rights was 
during the Carter administration. But that moment was short-lived, and not really focused on U.S. 
domestic policy. Indeed, the “ghost” of Senator Bricker haunted the Senate, but this time in the 
witness rooms of the Foreign Relations Committee rather than the Judiciary Committee. The Carter 
administration’s interest in human rights was clearly about U.S. foreign policy, and not about 
bringing the virtues of international human rights to the American people. Although both 
Covenants were signed by Carter and sent together in a package with two other human rights 
treaties—the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD). The U.S. ratified the ICCPR in 1992, and CERD in 1994. 
 
Even though Carter signed the ICESCR, the extent of U.S. commitment to those rights wavered 
considerably during his administration. In Presidential Directive NSC-30, which outlined the formal 
human rights policy of the United States, Carter had stated that “It will also be a continuing U.S. 
objective to promote basic economic and social rights (e.g., adequate food, education, shelter and 
health).”18 Yet, during the drafting of a human rights speech Carter was to deliver in May 1977, his 
primary speechwriter, Griffin Smith, removed a passage on economic and social rights that had been 
placed in the speech by a subordinate. Objecting to the use of “rights” to describe “needs,” Smith 
wrote in memo to the original drafter of the speech: 
 
                                                 
17 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 833 (IX), December 4, 1954. 
18 Full text of the Directive online at http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd30.pdf (accessed 




Human Rights & Human Welfare, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 60
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/hrhw/vol5/iss1/60
[I]f that definition ever gets so broad that it also includes Milk for Hottentots, its usefulness will be lost. I know 
the temptation is strong to define one’s pet project as a human right so that the president will appear to be 
endorsing it, but let’s keep human rights to mean human rights, and find another label for economic and social 
progress (Hartmann 2001: 408). 
 
Others in the Administration were also worried that having a clearly supportive and defined position 
on economic and social rights might torpedo the entire human rights portion of the 
Administration’s policy. It was definitely the last component in a hierarchy of importance the Carter 
administration placed on different categories of human rights. At first, the emphasis was on 
“integrity rights”—especially those dealing with disappearances and torture—followed by political 
rights, and finally, economic and social rights. With the Cold War beginning to heat up again—the 
discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba; the invasion of Afghanistan; the victory of the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua—political rights began to receive priority. But even in that, human rights overall were 
placed on the back-burner, having become a “moral luxury, a stranger to sober geostrategic 
calculations” (Hartmann 2001: 419). 
 
Looking again to the process of ratifications of the Covenants, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee held hearings in Novemeber 1979. Events in Iran soon overshadowed the work of the 
Committee, and the package of four treaties was never sent to the floor of the Senate until a decade 
later. But the hearings are instructive nonetheless. Most of the testimony was strongly in support of 
ratification, and the attitude of the Committee members seemed to reflect that support. Opposition 
from witnesses, while resolute, was certainly less shrill than it was in the early 1950s, and wasn’t 
nearly as much about communism as it was about a more contemporary economic conservatism that 
would eventually dominate domestic policy. For example, Phyllis Schlafley’s written statement to the 
Committee suggested that “…article 2 [of the ICESCR] could mean that the United States is making 
a legally binding commitment to legislate unlimited taxes on ourselves in order to support every 
other country in the world” (1979: 110) J. Philip Anderegg claimed that a clause in Article 7 of the 
ICESCR19 would require federal legislation interfering in private ownership of, for example, family-
owned businesses, in order to outlaw nepotism (Ibid., 165). 
 
Another opponent, Oscar Garibaldi (who is currently a member of the ultra-conservative Federalist 
Society) testified that the ICESCR 
 
…is largely the historical product of Marxist ideology espoused by the Soviet bloc, coupled with the non-
Communist world’s postwar infatuation with various forms of democratic socialism. In other words, however 
worthy its general goals may look, this is largely a document of collectivist inspiration, alien in spirit and 
philosophy to the principles of a free economy….Second, viewed in the best possible light, this is a big 
government treaty which, by virtue of the principle of progressive implementation, would commit the United 
States to ever-increasing levels of welfare, an ever-increasing governmental control of the economy, and ever-
increasing restrictions on individual initiative and freedom. (Ibid., (323) 
 
It is perhaps the second half of this quote that is illuminating in terms of the language, especially in 
comparison to the objections of conservatives in the 1950s, whose language was far more incendiary 
than an appeal for limiting “government control” over the economy and “ever-increasing levels of 
welfare.” This is precisely the language that would be employed by Ronald Reagan, who was elected 
one year after these hearings. 
                                                 
19 Clause ( c ) requires States-parties to the Covenant to recognize the right of “[e]qual opportunity for everyone to be 
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Reagan’s election in 1980 ushered in a dramatic shift in U.S. human rights policy. But even the 
Carter administration had begun to speak of economic and social “rights” as not really being rights, 
and probably best dealt with through the U.S. Agency for International Development. The foreign 
policy of the first Reagan administration was clearly focused on confronting the Soviet Union, and 
quashing a “growing communist threat” in Latin America. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s famous article in 
Commentary20 would set the tone for Reagan’s Western Hemispheric policy, but also made it quite 
clear what the U.S. would mean when it talked about “human rights”—curbing the Soviet Union’s 
newfound appetite for imperialism. 
 
In October of 1981, a memo from Deputy Secretary of State William Clark and Undersecretary of 
Management Richard Kennedy to Secretary of State Alexander Haig was “accidentally leaked” to the 
New York Times. The memo suggested the Administration reinvigorate U.S. human rights policy, but 
suggested that the language of “human rights” be replaced with the more precise terms, “individual 
rights,” “political rights,” and “civil liberties.”21 There was no mention at all of economic and social 
rights. The next edition of the U.S. State Department Human Rights Report had removed the 
category of economic and social rights entirely.  
 
Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 
explained that, in the Administration’s view, the recognition of economic and social rights created 
confusion about human rights priorities and a “dispersion of energy in ending human rights 
violations” (Alston 1990: 373). Abrams also maintained that economic and social rights merely serve 
as a cover; that nations that champion the cause of economic and social rights only do so in order to 
excuse their violations of “real” civil and political rights (ibid.). By 1986 this new language of human 
rights, and the rejection of economic and social rights, was straightforward and “unquestionably 
consistent:” 
 
This process of reinventing the concept of human rights to make it resemble more closely the ideological 
predilections of the U.S. Government reached a high point in a June 1988 statement by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs [Paula Dobriansky), in which she sought to dispel 
a number of “myths” about human rights, the first of which was that “‘economic and social rights’ constitute 
human rights” (ibid., 374). 
 
Economic and Social Rights: Present…and Future? 
 
So far this paper has seen how we have gone from the initial idea of economic and social rights, as 
first suggested by Roosevelt, to the internationalization of that idea and the United States’ 
subsequent rejection of the idea of securing economic and social goods through rights claims, or 
promoting, for example, development assistance as a human right. What is the American 
understanding of rights generally, and of economic and social rights in particular? 
 
As we can see, most opposition to economic and social rights is vaguely expressed, or instrumental 
for some other purpose. During the 1940s and 1950s, the movement ended up really being about 
“legislation by treaty,” and the fear—perhaps unfounded and paranoid—that this new “international 
constitutionalism” would amount to bypassing the democratic process in the United States. While 
we can say that opposition to economic and social rights was simply anti-communist rhetoric, that 
                                                 
20 Kirkpatrick (1979); see also Kirkpatrick (1981) 
21 New York Times (1981); see also Alston (1990: 372) and Hartmann (2001: 426). 
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rhetoric was mean to protect something. That “something” is an abstraction usually called “the 
American way of life.” 
 
As we can see, proponents of economic and social rights won’t get very far arguing for ratification 
of the ICESCR—especially in the post-9/11 environment. Perhaps the unlikelihood of getting the 
U.S. to recognize these “rights” as rights means we can look for other, perhaps more effective and 
convincing ways of achieving the same ends. The language of human rights can still be of use—but 
that language needs to overcome the dualist view of the state that has always lied at the heart of this 
debate, and debates about human rights generally: that civil and political rights are “negative” and 
economic and social rights are “positive.” Rights are neither one of those things: rights are meant to 
protect our ability to will our own ends. The state is the institution that (a) protects those rights, and 
(b) creates the conditions necessary for their enjoyment; in other words, to will our own ends. 
 
In order to more effectively counter the critics of economic and social rights, proponents of those 
rights will need to reconsider the language of rights, and speak to their opponents in their own 
language—the language of the market. They need to demonstrate—as Sunstein has—that the state is 
vital to the survival of the market, and the state has obligations to live up to so the market can 
survive, and protect our ability to meet our economic and social needs. The idea of a “free market” 
is a myth; the market only exists because the state regulates it. Unregulated capitalism would eat 
itself alive—as recent “corporate scandals” amply demonstrate. 
 
There is not one good in the ICESCR that anyone would object to people enjoying. The problem is 
in claiming a right to something, and what would satisfy the enjoyment of that right. Clearly 
Americans believe that the state has economic and social obligations to its citizens; otherwise, why 
not just abandon the Social Security system, if it’s so much trouble? Why shouldn’t the elderly have 
to pay the same for their medications as everyone else does; after all, there is no recognized right to 
free or discounted drugs. If we believe that they only way we can get a guarantee out of the state for 
something like social security or education is by claiming a right to it, and the United States does not 
recognize those rights, then why they exist? 
 
Not all obligations of the state arise from a rights claim. If we are to accept this, then we also have 
to accept the fact that the state does more than just enforce rights claims. The state is much more. 
As Roosevelt recognized sixty years ago, citizens have expectations of their economic and political 
systems. We need to think of a way to reformulate economic and social guarantees in some other 
way other than claiming a direct right to those goods. Non-discrimination is a very good start. But I 
would argue that most of what economic and social rights are really about is state regulation of civil 
society. And by suggesting that the market is indispensable for the realization of most economic and 
social rights, we can begin to bridge the gap between those who do not believe in those rights. By 
doing so, proponents of economic and social guarantees are able to argue that the state has an 
enormously important role to play, because without its powers of regulation there would be no 
market. 
 
The challenge is this: very few Americans are aware of the existence of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. A 1997 poll asked respondents whether “there is an official document that sets forth 
human rights for everyone worldwide,” 7% answered in the affirmative, but didn’t know what it was 
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called; 8% mentioned the Universal Declaration.22 Without an enumeration of “human rights,” I 
would imagine that the general public considers human rights to be the same as basic constitutional 
rights in the United States. Every president since Carter has slightly redefined the basic thrust of 
what the U.S. means when it says “human rights.” The current administration, speaks more about 
“human dignity,” couched within an evangelistic rhetoric that “freedom is a gift from the Almighty.” 
Julie Mertus is less charitable: for Bush, human rights is a “random rendition of the administration’s 
current priorities” (Mertus 2003: 374). In a speech soon after 9/11, Lorne Craner, the head of the 
State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, stated that the U.S. stance 
toward human rights is “to focus on U.S. national interests…advancing human rights and 
democracy in countries important to the United States” in order to “protect the values that underpin 
civil society at home” (ibid., 373). 
 
When this administration speaks of “the values that underpin civil society at home,” it is referring to 
the market and private—presumably faith-based—charities. “Economic rights” mean “market 
freedoms,” and social rights—welfare—are better handled outside the state. Economic and social 
rights have been realized. The public seems to support this rendition: over the past twenty-five years 
we have witness the entrenchment of a “domestic consensus” that favors reigning in the regulatory 
and welfare-providing powers of the state, and an increased faith in, and reliance upon, civil society 
institutions—including the market and private charities—for the securing of the object of economic 
and social “rights.” The further we go down this track, the less attractive economic and social rights 
claims become, because of the assumption that, as rights, whatever they are must be provided by the 
state (food, health, housing). Proponents of economic and social rights—meaning economic and 
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